Shock and Allegory in Balabanov’s Cargo 200

The problem with Cargo 200, in a sentence: it wants to maintain the shocking locus of the film as both a thematically coherent linchpin of events, characters, narrative strands, etc. and as a decidedly “meaningless,” shocking violence that cannot be articulated, grasped, or accounted for “finally” by the film in which it appears.

Accordingly, the literature that attempts to negotiate or justify this rhetoric of shock – that is, where the shock must both “exceed” and “express” meaning – finds itself in a tight spot. Gregory Carleton’s article in Studies in Soviet and Russian Cinema, “A tale of two wars: sex and death in Ninth Company and Cargo 200,” seems to me representative in this regard (and there don’t seem to be all that many English language essays on Cargo 200). On the one hand, he writes, Cargo 200 is “groundbreaking precisely because of the visual explicitness of sexual scenes”: which is to say, it is the “explicitness” and “excessiveness” itself that becomes meaningful through its negative, transgressive gesture. This is also to say that the “content” is both relatively unstylized and of secondary importance. What matters most is the raw, visceral shock of the scenes: for this reason, “the graphic scene is essential, especially as it plays on audience expectations.”

It is thus first and foremost a matter of “affect” and moving the spectator, of which “shock,” in this view, occupies a privileged relation, as the first affect amongst affects. (Much could be said of the literalist, direct, and unmediated character attributed to “shock,” and how this “ground for the real” itself piggybacks off conceptions of the body as “corporeal” and “material” – or in any case, self-identical.) The proximity of discourses of shock to discourses of physiology should in this respect be questioned. I mean, are “quieter” responses the less affective for it, or for that matter the less shocking? Can love shock? Can laughter? If shock is nothing more than the “touching” of the subject, as told through a discourse of physiology, then it becomes difficult to assign a magnitude or threshold past which a given affect breaks free of the pantheon of responses to become a more direct, visceral elicitation. It seems to me that everything said of shock could just as well be said of jokes and laughter.

That being said, this logic of shock is in actuality only strategically (and rather disingenuously) dispensed, if only for the reason that, paradoxically, it is the shock itself that is supposed to express, or bear the weight of, determinate, historical themes. Which is to say, shock cannot remain an exclusively affective phenomenon if it is to find historical or cultural justification. To become allegorical, it must move beyond this simple, reductive “explicitness.” So after describing the rape scenes as “groundbreaking” for their “visual explicitness,” Carleton turns to their “symbolic conceit,” though it’s never said how the one is able to suddenly, if selectively, coextend with the other. The “explicit” is after all directly opposed to the “symbolic” and the “allegorical”; where the former claims to require nothing of the viewer, of culture – it circumvents the interpretive process, which is why it’s presented as “affective,” i.e. direct, unmediated, ‘of the body, not the mind’ – the latter suggests a specific critical or allegorical motivation at work in its presentation.

Though the affective, unmediated character attributed to shock is able to secure for itself a “ground” for inquiry, it also, for the same reason, cuts itself off from history, politics, culture. How can the explicit, the unmediated, the direct, be made to link up with the broader, and certainly “mediated,” problems that surround it? Carleton seems to be struggling with this problem when he writes:

“Moreover, visualized sexuality in each [Ninth Company and Cargo 200] is not a coincidental occurrence but connects the films in an intertextual relationship and broader meta-narrative. It draws from and informs the legacy of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, in particular how the war’s figuration has been shaped by glasnost/early post-Soviet representations. Central to this meta-narrative is rape, as a symbolic conceit of the anti-epic and its themes of violation and betrayal.”

In a way, Carleton here simply repeats the question. Even his language for describing the relationship between the rape scenes and the historical forces represented in the film carefully maintains their distinction (”connects,” “draws from,” “informs,” etc.), no doubt because the relationship between them is tenuous, unmotivated, and difficult to locate. In which case, it becomes difficult to describe the shockingly violent center of the film as an allegory for anything, if only because it is what it was meant to be: arbitrary, gratuitous, and non-symbolic.

Carleton’s attempt to find a “symbolic conceit” in the rape scenes, after having presented them as “explicit” and ahistorical in their “affect,” seems to me symptomatic of the methodological problems within the film itself. But even if we were to give generous readings of Carleton and Cargo 200, the allegorical reading suggested would be just as problematic. I mean, if, as Carleton argues, “Central to this meta-narrative is rape, as a symbolic conceit of the anti-epic and its themes of violation and betrayal,” then it would be like comparing the relationship between the Soviet people and its government to the rape of an adolescent girl. So, even if we did grant this film the allegorical status it seems to desire, we would be confronted with still more problematic metaphors and analogies, none of which seem particularly insightful or sophisticated.

After all, the film is titled Cargo 200, which suggests that the true concern of this film is the death of soldiers in a needless, foreign war; in which case the rape of Angelika would stand in for the “rape” of Soviet men by the Soviet state? That the corpse of Angelika’s fiance is rolled into bed with her suggests as much, symbolically-speaking, but why these two acts – rape and war – should be drawn as homologous is left unexplained, assumed. (That both are horrible seems to me the thinnest of possible relations. By this logic, any horrible act could serve this narrative just as well.) In any event, the rape of Angelika would in this sense appear as a rather curious, and it would seem inappropriate, symbol for what “cargo 200″ represents: the murder of young men by the state. That said, we are never really told why this young woman’s body has been made the site for the suffering of innumerable symbolic violences, why this body should be made to bear the problems and violences of the nation in its entirety – from religion to politics to the military to pop culture. However, as soon as the question becomes too irritating to turn away, the film is of course able to fall back on the “shock” alibi, according to which the film’s own inability to explain itself is supposed to be the explanation.

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Eli or Thorkelson on the gender of the academic name

Eli Thorkelson, of decasia fame, makes some compelling observations about “the gender of the academic name“:

Anyway, my friend said she’d noticed that, when academics talk about other academics, they are likely to use the first and last name when referring to a woman academic, while men academics often get mentioned by last name only. This to her was entirely part of everyday life, undesirable but obvious.

But I was taken somewhat aback by this claim, and I think the other guy there was too. I realized afterwards, to my shame, that our common reaction was one of doubt. We wanted to think of counterexamples. Exceptions that would disprove the rule. Isn’t Judith Butler pretty reliably called Judith Butler? we were asked. But isn’t Butler a pretty common name? Well, but there aren’t any other famous academics called Butler, now are there? Or take Simone de Beauvoir. Pretty much always Simone de Beauvoir, isn’t she? Well, yes. Who could deny that? While on the other hand Sartre, it came to my mind, is indeed pretty much always just Sartre. Or take Hannah Arendt. Is Hannah Arendt always Hannah Arendt? Well, yes, pretty often, though I think maybe at the philosophy department in Paris-8 she may occasionally become just Arendt. But other mid-century German male philosophers seem to go by their last names far more often. Marcuse is just Marcuse. And “Adorno” also seems to travel pretty well by itself, as a practically self-contained sign of pessimistic dialectical prose convolution. Or take Eve Sedgwick. She’s pretty often called Eve Sedgwick, no? But not really Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, that’s a mouthful. We didn’t reach agreement about that.

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Nina Beier’s Possibly In Progress “Non Finito”

Nina Beier, Non Finito Series, Wood, metal, 20 x 20 cm, 2009

Nina Beier, "Non Finito Series," Wood, metal, 20 x 20 cm, 2009

Though interesting enough on their own, these two works by the Berlin-based Danish artist Nina Beier form something entirely new when taken together. In the first (and the order is important), a “horizontal skyscraper” is displayed in (possibly) unfinished form. We say “possibly” because, according to its placard, this “sculpture in process is exhibited or sold on the agreement that the artist might or might not choose to continue working on it.” Though this gesture may seem tired, practiced, potentially disingenuous, it nonetheless strikes a key that reverberates across the “life” of an artwork. For one, the work itself may or may not be finished; which is to say, one may or may not know what one is exhibiting or buying; which is also to say, one may expect more and receive something “less,” the artwork as it already is. It could even be said to undermine the concept of a work of art in the most direct way possible, through the threat that it may only be a rough draft, a scribble. That it depends upon an “agreement” with the exhibitor or owner may even promise to raise legal issues, should the artist choose to exploit that contract in a way that would startle, and no doubt enrage, any party naive enough to not take it seriously. The possibilities, needless to say, are endless – literally.

Nina Beier, Framing Horizontal Skyscraper Non Finito, framed photograph, 2009

Nina Beier, "Framing Horizontal Skyscraper Non Finito," framed photograph, 2009

The work does not “end” there, however. A separate work, “Framing Horizontal Skyscraper Non Finito,” is nothing more than a “framed studio shot of an artwork. When documented during each exhibition, a print of this new photograph replaces the previous one in the frame.” Again, this gesture could easily be mistaken for a tired, pseudo-Modernist reprieve, or for yet another bout of feigned institutional self-reflexivity, if not for the fact that the original work is itself (possibly) “in progress.” Thus a “system” of sorts manages to emerge from this careful delineation. With the modification of the one, comes the modification of the other, and in such a way that it need not end there. “Agreements” could be exploited to complicate still other agreements. Of course, Beier’s formula (and it is at this point that it becomes a formula) could rather easily be be made to grow tiresome, or in any case tedious. But that’s just it: through this clever variation on the artwork that awaits “completion,” this work demands that further steps be taken elsewhere, according to protocol that begin to resemble bureaucratic measures, or at least needless stipulations. It makes a mockery of what it at first seems to be: yet another work that depends upon the viewer’s “realization.”

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Brakhage Meets Tarkovsky

While doing research on Tarkovsky’s film Stalker I came across this titillating Chicago Review article by Stan Brakhage (as told to Jennifer Dorn) that recounts their amusing encounter at the 1983 Telluride Film Festival.

Brakhage Meets Tarkovsky

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Going beyond unconditional acceptance: Carl Rogers and individual subjectivity

A joke told by my supervisor:

A client speaking to his Rogerian therapist says: “I am so depressed, I just don’t feel like is worth living.” The therapist replies: “I hear you saying that you are in pain and that you are not sure how you will ever feel better.” The client replies by saying: “I really feel I would be better off dead.” To which therapist comments: “You really are at your wits ends about what to do.” The client stands and moves to the window of the office and opening it up, the therapist says observes, “You are showing me how much pain you are in, how desperate you are.” The client then jumps out the window – the therapist says, “Splat.”

The therapeutic approach of Carl Rogers (1995a; 1995b) is one of empathy, listening, acceptance, and minimal intervention. For Rogers, person-centered therapy is based around two related concepts: reflective listening and unconditional acceptance. In this manner, the therapist is able to listen and reflect the client’s narrative in a space where the whole of their experience (affective, content, etc.) is unconditionally accepted by the therapist. This allows the client to become increasingly comfortable with aspects of themselves that may be threatening, shameful, scary, anxiety-causing, etc., which facilitates growth and eventual change. Rogers stated this process as follows:

“I can state the overall hypothesis in one sentence as follows. If I can provide a certain type of relationship, the other person will discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth, and change and personal development will occur” (Rogers, 1995a p 33, my emphasis).

Accordingly, two aspects of person-centered therapy are immediately clear. First is that the therapeutic moment is relational, involving an interaction with an “other” and second that this interaction is markedly different than most other types of relationships. While it is generally understood that the therapist’s unconditional acceptance of the client is what makes this relationship different than others, I would like to briefly argue that this is only a part of the story. Instead, I will make the case that it is the reflective listening of the therapist that provides the groundwork for a type of relationship that is therapeutic and helps the client to achieve a greater subjective sense of understanding.

I would like to begin by simply noting that the above quote is preceded by the word “if”. To me, this signifies that the type of relationship that Rogers is talking should not be taken for granted but should instead be seen as a goal that the therapist is working towards. Indeed, in addition to unconditionally accepting the client, Rogers also stressed the importance of having a genuine and real relationship with the client. Accordingly, it seems clear that he was aware that the idea of having a real, unconditionally accepting relationship is paradoxical. The “if” then puts the onus on the therapist to work to create a relationship with the client, where they become a companion who is both idealized (accepting) and real (genuine) to the client. It is worth noting that this is an extension of the typical therapeutic alliance, in that there is not only an alliance but it is of a certain type – idealized and real.

This paradoxical relationship is established through the use of reflective listening, whereby the therapist tries to sensitize him or herself to the phenomenological moment-to-moment experiencing of their client. Importantly, despite the mirroring connotations, reflective listening is not so much a matter of reflecting back a mirror image of the client as it is about altering it in subtle ways. In this manner, the therapist joins the client not only in the construction of their narrative but also helps to deepen and broaden out certain aspects of it, which the client may or may not have been aware of. Accordingly, the “real” quality of the therapist is revealed in their ability to be an “other” to the client who is able to express a full range of human thoughts and emotions in an integrated and comprehensive fashion

One way of seeing this process is through the metaphor of the therapist acting as a scaffold for the client’s subjective experiencing. Through reflective listening the therapist not only embraces the client’s subjectivity but in a manner deepens it by giving voice to other aspects of the client’s experience, which for whatever reason are not being stated. Clearly, the therapist is never able to mirror phenomenologically the experiences of the client but he works to co-construct with the client a richer subjective world. In this manner, the therapist scaffolds – or provides a structure, which both supports and extends the client’s experiencing. That this experience occurs in a space where they feel they will be accepted unconditionally helps to enable them to become more comfortable with their narrative.

What both limits and enables this process is the therapist’s inactivity within other spheres of the client’s experience (as illustrated by the joke above). By existing primarily as a scaffold for the client the therapist is able to maintain the illusion of being both unconditionally accepting and real. Through limiting their activity to reflective listening the therapist lessens their own subjective experiencing giving the illusion of an idealized other. In turn, the client becomes able to more fully develop the reflective qualities of subjective experiencing, which the therapist reflectively supports (via scaffolding). In this manner the client brings increasingly richer subjective experiences to the forefront that receive the support and validation of the therapist.

What differentiates the properties of reflexive listening from those of the therapeutic alliance is the manner in which they are used. For Rogers the increased reflective capacity of the subjective self became the main motivation for change. Accordingly, he was able to limit the activity of the therapist towards working on his or her own unconditional acceptance (no small task!). Other therapies, while stressing the importance of the alliance, augment it through increased interaction with the client. This speaks to the romantic and in my opinion endearing and permanent aspects of Rogers’ view of human growth as able to overcome the distance individual subjectivity.

References:

Rogers, C. R. (1995a). Client Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory. Philadelphia, PA: Trans-Atlantic Publications.

Rogers, C. R. (1995b). On Becoming a Person. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.

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Speculative Realism and Animal Studies Discussion

The Inhumanities and Speculative Heresy are hosting a cross-blog event on the topic of critical animal studies from the perspective of speculative realism. The first post up – on Levinas, the Other, and animals – has set the stage for what promises to be a lively, rich discussion, centered around the following question:

While speculative realism has critiqued anthropocentrism in ontology, and critical animal studies has critiqued anthropocentrism in ethics, there has yet to be many productive connections made between the two. With each offering the other important insights, the question to be asked is, what is the relation between ethics and ontology? Does a realist ontology require the suspension of any ethical imperatives? Can ethics and norms be grounded in something real? Are nonhuman actors capable of ethical relations?

The submission/participation guidelines:

Besides the participants of the two blogs and anyone we are able to recruit to respond, we are also opening up the field for answers to anyone. All answers must be 1500-2000 words, and submissions for answers must be recieved by Friday, November 13th. Inquiries can be sent to Inhumanitiesblog@gmail.com or to the email addresses of Scu, Greg, Craig, Ben, and Nick. I hope you are all looking forward to this event as much as we are!

I for one plan to throw my hat in the ring – on the subject of “instinct”, its epistemological history, and the way it shapes dominant scientific and philosophical conceptions of the animal.

Frankly, it’s about time critical animal studies regained some momentum and sparked some genuine interest in contemporary schools of thought. The major post-structuralist thinkers, Derrida excepting, were not too kind to this question, and the embarrassing hole they left for us desperately needs to be filled.

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Pirated Theory Sites

Via Mariborcan, see Open Reflections‘ round-up of (and commentary on) the major text, philosophy, and theory sharing sites, which are:

However, as counterpoint to Janneke Adema’s echoing of John Perry Barlow’s well-known declaration that “information wants to be free“, it should be reminded that information does not just want to be free. As Goldsmith and Wu put it in Who Controls the Internet?:

“The Internet has been celebrated for allowing open, universal communication. ‘Information wants to be free,’ John Perry Barlow famously declared. But information does not, in fact, want to be free. It wants to be labeled, organized, and filtered so it can be discovered, cross-referenced, and consumed.” (Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu. Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006: 51)

With so many texts now available online, in searchable pdf format, wouldn’t it be wonderful if they could be searched, cross-referenced, tagged, etc. before downloading? The kind of possibilities – conceptual, and research-wise – this would open up for scholarship is mind-boggling if taken to its conclusion.

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Bollywood, Rick Astley, and the Israeli Arms Industry

Amid growing international concern over the India-Israel arms trade, the Israeli firm Rafael unveiled the below marketing video — described by Stephen Trimble of The Dew Line as a “catastrophic collision of Bollywood and the arms industry” -- at the Aero India 2009 defense convention in Bangalore. In the months since its posting, the video has become the errant poster-child — even earning a reprimand from The Jerusalem Post — for the new age of covert international arms trading.

Noah Shachtmann of Wired’s DangerRoom has deemed it “the most atrocious defense video of all time, just days into the Iron Eagles — our celebration of the awesomely bad videos of the military-industrial complex”.

Every element of the promotional film is just plain wrong. The sari-clad, “Indian” dancers look all too ashkenaz and zaftig. The unshaven, hawk-nosed, leather-clad leading man appears to be a refugee from You Don’t Mess With the Zohan. Then of course, there’s the implication that the Indian military is somehow like a helpless woman who “need(s) to feel safe and sheltered.”

But for my rupees, the worst thing about the video is the damn theme song they’ve concocted for the thing. To pimp its weapons, Rafael produced a sitar-heavy twist on Rick Astley’s love letter to Satan, “Together Forever,” complete with a new chorus: “Dinga dinga, dinga dinga, dinga dinga, dinga dinga dee.” The rest of us now have to suffer for that bad, bad choice.

The video may be as offensive to our tastes as to our morals, but it’s also, perhaps, a sign of things to come. As a kind of post-modern pastiche of traditions and fads, light-hearted pop songs and mechanistic war, the video seems to embody perfectly the brazen disregard — where anything goes, and nothing is sacred — that we would expect from an arms dealer. Even more remarkable is the fact that these videos are themselves the product of a formula of sorts, where diverse archetypical cultural affects are combined, to easy effect. Saurabh Joshi of StratPost, the South Asian Defense news site, inquired further into Rafael’s marketing practices:

StratPost spoke to Assy Josephy the Director of Exhibitions for Rafael about how this video came about. “In Israel we have Jewish people from India, so we know about Bollywood and the song and dance numbers. Israelis are generally aware of Indian culture. This video is to help build familiarity between India and Israel and Rafael,” he says.

But this is not the first time Rafael has exhibited something of the sort. Josephy says Rafael has displayed such videos in many countries with various themes customized to the culture of the locations. “In Brazil we did a video of football. Football is very big there. In Paris the video had a theme that included Napoleon and the Renaissance. In Poland our video had themes of Chopin and Copernicus. In England it was about Shakespeare,” says Josephy.

Though we can only hope to one day get our hands on the Shakespeare defense video — an odd phrase to be sure — the greater point to be taken here is that even arms dealing can be “Epcotized”. The Rafael video is, no doubt, a classic case of a capital enterprise creating an image of cultural understanding that disguises its opposite, a generic, reproducible schema that can be ‘customized’ to capture any given culture. Only in this case, the product is a missile, not international cuisine, and the means for marketing — “culture” in quotes — is also the target.

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True Blood, Homosexuality, and Vampire PR

Three recent films/series use the plight of fantastical beings (vampires, mutants, aliens) trying to gain acceptance into society as metaphors for the real life struggles of embattled, minority groups. Is the metaphor successful, or does it also work against its apparent progressivism by indulging in the very stereotypes it claims to resist? But first, a brief summary:

* True Blood uses the fictional acceptance of vampires into society as a metaphor for how the United States regards the gay community and the gay rights struggle. (A stream of amusing markers draws clear parallels between the two: in the opening credits a lit up sign displays the message “God Hates Fangs”; vampires are said to “come out of the coffin”; and it’s mentioned in passing that Vermont was the first state to legalize marriage between humans and vampires.) Michelle Goldberg nonetheless finds True Blood conservative through and through: though the vampire-homosexual analogy is “cheeky and clever”, “it has troubling implications, because the vampires, political rhetoric aside, aren’t really interested in joining human society. Unlike the misunderstood X-Men heroes, most of the vampires we meet are arrogant, perverse, and cruel—everything the far right believes gays to be.” So is True Blood a sophisticated, sympathetic tale of the plight of an excluded, embattled group, or does it simply make use of that plight to imbue its story, at strategic moments, with a serious, charged, and culturally relevant aura?

* X-Men also borrows heavily from the culture wars landscape to cast the mutants as a misunderstood, vilified group that’s gradually gaining acceptance. And just like in True Blood, a more militant faction, here lead by Magneto, threatens to sabotage the advances made by the mainstreaming, well-behaved majority. But the more heavily the mutant struggle for acceptance draws on gay rights themes, the more problematic its relation to it becomes. Mutants are, after all, by definition more dangerous and threatening to humans proper. They have a power in excess of the norm, which at once differentiates their clearly demarked kind from that of the ‘normal’ and pitches it against them. Though this lack of self-control is just as often likened to adolescence and sexual development, the fact that it’s unique in posing a real danger to their world limits the comparison and ultimately distinguishes it from safe, nonthreatening sexuality ‘proper’.

* District 9, still out in the theaters, presents a similar problem. The aliens stand in for all sorts of subaltern or excluded groups, and through that substitution the film is able to elaborate a powerful, progressive critique of certain states’ treatment of different groups; but at the same time, a delicate dance is required to keep the metaphor from circling back and affirming the common, derogatory representation of particular ethnic groups as nonhumans, subhumans, animals, etc.

Each of these films (or series) also makes consistent use of ‘fake’ news footage that invokes past and ongoing civil rights struggles, and borrows heavily from the politically-charged atmosphere most associated with culture wars social issues. In all three we are sporadically treated to clips of warring pundits, for instance, one conservative, the other ‘tolerant’; or heated split-screen debates between vampire and church, or mutant and human, spokespeople. The specter of a high-stakes national debate, sensitive to the slightest misstep, is everywhere present, hanging precipitously over the heroes’ heads – mutant, vampire, and alien.

The progressive, or empathetic, representation of subaltern groups as fantastically, often physiologically different is of course not a recent phenomenon; nor is the prominent inclusion of a media or public relations sphere in the development of narrative events and the creation of a ‘national’ atmosphere (as in King Kong, for instance). But what is perhaps historically novel in this gaining trend is the media’s dramatic promotion in importance: it is a premise of all three – District 9, especially – that the media world holds a powerful, if not determinate, position over the fate of the groups in question. In the latter film, news footage of alien riots, with shaky, live, street footage and commentary from ’specialists’, approximates the familiar instant-retrospective gaze of a culture comfortable with having an underclass and the violence required to maintain it. Whether we see in this footage the LA riots or the razing of Cape Town’s District Six under the Group Areas Act of 1966, the image of history we are given is purposefully generic and prepared.

Freud said of the dream that it’s not just what reality the dream is representing that matters, but why that reality had to take the dream-form it did. We know that the vampires represent homosexuals, but what is it of our time that encourages the representation of homosexuals as vampires? Or of Zimbabwean, Mozambican, and Malawian migrants as aliens? The ease with which matters of race, in particular, have been reimagined, historically, as matters of species needs no introduction; nor for that matter does the habitual representation of ’sexual deviants’ as predatory beings.

True Blood in particular runs up against this problem repeatedly: namely, how to draw upon the thematically-rich struggle of gay rights, as a readymade template for any mythical excluded identity, while at the same time stopping short of affirming, through the thriller/horror genre, the very prejudices it otherwise claims to regard as oppressive. Because the vampires really are dangerous, and do actually prey on humans, the comparison with homosexuality must be handled delicately, if not avoided altogether at the appropriate moments. When Godric blasphemes that humans are justified in fearing vampires, his wisdom assumes an almost extra-diegetic, directorial position. Does this blasphemy, then, amount to a tacit endorsement of the conservative view that finds the alleged promiscuity of the gay community to be the true roadblock to their social acceptance – hence the prominent vampire ‘mainstreaming’ theme of the show – or is it the opposite, an instance of the vampire rights theme diverting from its occasional analogy, gay rights?

In this light, to be sure, the show’s invocation of the plight of the gay community can seem disingenuous, a plundering for story parts.

All of this is driven home by the recent episodes with Godric (Allan Hyde), Eric’s (Alexander Skarsgård) ‘maker’. Where it was assumed that Godric had been captured by the Fellowship of the Sun, the extremist conservative Christian church, he had in fact turned himself over in an attempt to create peace and understanding because, as he says at one point, ‘let’s be honest – vampires have not exactly acted peacefully to humans’ (paraphrase). This admission raises the issue of the vampires’ true dangerousness to a thematic level: it’s the first time the vampires’ culpability is acknowledged and treated explicitly by the show. Until Godric made this perspective his own, and introduced it to the storyline, it existed solely as a contradiction or ideological problem in the makeup of the True Blood universe, rather than a problem the characters themselves are dealing with, diegetically. Accordingly, the clip above, in two parts, shows Nan Flanagan (Jessica Tuck), the vampires’ lead PR agent, chewing out Godric for creating a national PR disaster for the vampire cause. It’s the first time we see the characters interact with the national campaign, and it’s the first time that we get a real sense for ‘the politics of vampirism’ and the concessions that must be made, if only to prevent a battle that cannot be won. It’s also the moment when the blame shifts, however gently, from the humans to the vampires. As a result, it would seem, the homosexuality-vampirism comparison is here put on hold, as if the writers did not want this shifting of blame to be ‘misread’ as an analogy for the gay community’s culpability, but even so the implication is somewhat unavoidable if unintentional.

In this respect, we may see some of the philosophical and political commentary on the show move into its inner workings. So maybe the Godric theme will crystallize into a more nuanced social commentary, or it could simply feed into the ‘mainstreaming’ theme, where the ‘vamps’ need to come to terms with their scary, violent nature and learn to domesticate themselves. I’m betting on the latter – Bill, after all, is supposed to be the model vampire of sorts – but either way the writing seems to have grown more sophisticated over the last season and its politics should be expected to do the same in the season ahead.

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The Lesser Power: Levinas on Judaism and Kenosis

Cheddar Mortadelle Cosmos, 2005, by Philippe Mayaux

Cheddar Mortadelle Cosmos, 2005, by Philippe Mayaux

My last post on the Biblical and philosophical concept of “kenosis” ended with a reference to Emmanuel Levinas, whose essay, “Judaism and Kenosis,” though unread at the time seemed to promise an altogether different approach that that found in contemporary and poststructuralist philosophies, which remain in large part derived from the Christian tradition. From Luther to Hegel to Derrida and Cixous, kenosis refers to the achievement of empathy, immersion, and other forms of ‘embodiment’ and ‘externalization’. For Levinas and the tradition he captures, kenosis suggests the opposite, an impasse between existences.

Levinas’ essay, for its part, radically departs from this, Christian tradition and sketches out, in my opinion, the more enlightening, the more philosophically authentic position. Where the Christian model stresses a seamless movement between, or transcendence of, ontological orders, the Judaic perspective stresses unbridgeable, unresolvable differences; which, I think, describes our world more closely than does the secular philosophical legacy of incarnation, identification. A fundamental schism in philosophy is thus revealed in the posing of this question, which is itself already a Christian one. Indeed, as one would expect, Levinas quickly reminds us that, “There is probably no need, here, to remind ourselves that the idea of divine incarnation is foreign to Jewish spirituality.” (Levinas Kenosis 114) Continue reading “The Lesser Power: Levinas on Judaism and Kenosis”

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