Donnel Stern’s introduction to the single volume edition of the psychoanalyst Edgar Levenson’s two major books, The Fallacy of Understanding (1972) and The Ambiguity of Change (1983) (published together by Analytic Press, 2005) attempts to both contextualize and highlight the important aspects of Levenson’s work. Not surprisingly, Stern’s introductory remarks are shaped by the current state of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. He traces how in these two books Levenson provided a cornerstone for the development of Relational psychoanalysis a popular contemporary therapeutic approach. According to Stern (2005a) “it was Levenson who first understood that continuous unconscious influence necessarily implies mutual enactment.” And that “the encompassing idea, the commodious concept of inevitable unconscious interaction that creates the possibility for articulation of the differences that came later, originated with Levenson” (p ix my emphases). While Stern locates the emergence of mutual enactment in Levenson’s structural system of thinking about psychoanalysis, it is clear to the reader that Levenson’s key contribution is the concept of mutual enactment and not the system from which it emerged. In this manner, the importance of mutual enactment is determined by its influence on object relations theory and its current role in psychoanalytic thinking.
Stern’s contextualization of mutual enactment is an interesting example of the process of studying the progress of psychoanalysis that Levenson himself utilizes in The Fallacy of Understanding. Echoing Thomas Kuhn and also in many ways Foucault, Levenson utilizes a historical and paradigmatic reading of psychoanalysis to develop his structural theory. Levenson identifies 3 paradigms of psychoanalysis, mechanical, informational, and ecological, identifying himself as part of the latter. Reflecting on the differences between these paradigms leads him to make the observation that behind each paradigm shift are the changing meanings of key terms (i.e. transference, defense, repression). He traces these changes to the need for them to represent more accurately the current socio-political context, as delineated by world events and the population being treated. Indeed, it is this insight about cultural influence extending to even psychoanalysis that fueled Levenson’s thinking about an ecological view of psychoanalysis. The impact of this thought is noted by Marylou Lionells, a contemporary of his who observed that:
“Levenson goes on to outline an approach to psychoanalysis that breaks every rule, violates every tenet, turns both theory and method on their heads … He further argues that as the treatment relationship unfolds, patient and analyst are inexorably intertwined in an elaborate recurrence of unconscious patterns, and that the recognition and elaboration of these patterns constitutes the experiential information that will be ultimately helpful” (Marylou Lionells, “Commentary: Psychotherapy of the Young Adult: The Fallacy of Understanding,” Center For Innovation in Psychoanalysis, 2006).
Here, we see the revolutionary or paradigm shifting impact of Levenson’s work, especially that of mutual enactment. To both Lionells and Stern, mutual enactment lead to changes in the meanings of terms like countertransference and the unconscious. These changes have become so engrained within contemporary thought and practice that Stern feels the need to remind the reader to appreciate how revolutionary they were when originally articulated. Despite their mainstream status and the popularity of Levenson much of the work he did on developing an ecological psychoanalysis appears to have been left unexplored and undeveloped. In fact, in the years that followed, psychology as a whole (likely spurned on by advances in cognitive science and neurology) seemed to endorse an increasingly reductionist view of the individual. Thus, while the idea of mutual enactment remains in psychoanalysis, much of the comprehensive and ecological view of the underlying psychological processes described by Levenson and others has until recently been forgotten. It is my contention that revisiting Levenson’s structural and ecological thinking has much to offer for both psychoanalysis and psychology as a whole. Accordingly, in what follows I would like to offer a brief overview of this view, paying particular attention of his movement from a structural approach initially closer to psychoanalysis to a structural approach that utilizes the science of semiotics or signs. Given that this is a topic I hope to revisit in future writings my intent here is more to lay out the theory and point to areas of conversation than to necessarily explore it in depth.
Levenson initially articulated his theory in The Fallacy of Understanding and as noted by Stern, it is decidedly structural. As mentioned above, he developed his theory by examining the previous paradigms of psychoanalysis and identifying in each of them an archetypical patient (the neurotic for Freud, the schizophrenic for Sullivan). He identifies his generation patient as the “drop-out” (also labeled “the contemporary patient”) who we would recognize as a member of the “tune-in turn-on dropout” of the 1960’s. What makes this generation unique is that although they rebelled from their parents they did so with the intent on showing how rigid and hypocritical they were. In this sense they rebelled while also staying related to what they were rebelling from. Levenson explains that this was possible because the “drop-outs” were parents who though appearing to value mutuality and open communication did not actually support independent thought and activity. This created a sense of inauthenticity, from which the contemporary patient was rebelling, but required relating to be validated.
Accordingly, Levenson noted that when brought into therapy these patients no longer wanted to be “cured” as in the traditional sense this meant returning or re-conforming to society. Indeed, he goes on to suggest that as a result of the actions of the “drop-out” so much of traditional society was being challenged and changed that perhaps the therapist himself or herself would require changing. He asks: “But what if the problem defines both the therapist and the patient? Perhaps one stops helping and begins a different kind of participation” (Levenson, 2005b p 138). In this manner, Levenson demonstrates a willingness to depart from the view of therapist as scientist to one of artist, or in other words from one of knower to one of constructer.
Building off this view he claims that the analyst who interprets is guilty of a “fallacy of understanding” whereas instead an analyst needs to embrace the “drop-outs” perspectives on the world. Drawing upon the concepts of holism, transformation, and relationships, Levenson argues that since experience and knowledge cannot be viewed outside of context and since context implies relationship then psychoanalysis must focus on relationships. Moreover, since relationships are not necessarily stable or determined (due to both changing context as well as the subjectivity of the other) the self in some senses strives for and constructs stability, which in large part is supplied by social order/structures. The way in which the societal structure influences individual construction of self, i.e. reflection, isomorphism, and transformation, is viewed as a type of “aesthetic structure”. This structure is what is recreated or altered in therapy and thus necessarily involves the therapist, who willingly or not partakes in its re-construction. Accordingly,
“In the larger society, patient and therapist are transformations of each other. But in addition, the patient has his own structure which is not only a construction, that is, part of the larger patterning of his society, but also a reflection of his biological givens (talents and flaws) and his idiosyncratic experience. It is this aesthetic structure which is the key to therapy” (Levenson, 2005b p 39).
What is of note in this early conceptualization is how Levenson thinks about the role of society in structuring an individual’s mental life. While acknowledging individual subjectivity, Levenson appears primarily concerned with the argument that psychological processes are rooted in system participation. Of course, it is this view that enables him to develop the idea of mutual enactment, as his structural theory requires that both therapist and patient be active in recreating patterned behaviors. It is not until The Ambiguity of Change that he begins to flesh out how his structural approach can also be used to think about intra-psychological processes.
Here, Levenson presents the reader with a question about psychological process, asking whether it is dynamics or semiotics. Underlying his question is a move away from thinking of psychological problems being caused by distortions of an inner reality that is conflicting with the real world to one that views the individual as being unable to solve the mysteries present in the world. These mysteries result from the complexities of cultural and semiotic life that the child is born into. More specifically, Levenson feels that “Psychological difficulties arise because of difficulty in sorting out the nuances of social experiences, especially as it is mediated through language … neurotic difficulties arise from semiotic incompetence” (Levenson, 2005c). In other words, cultural tools such as language are continuously mediating experience and that failures of mediation can cause psychological difficulties!
This is of course no small claim, especially for a psychoanalyst and opens up a number of ways of thinking about mental life and its relationship to mental difficulties. Levenson himself further explores the issue by discussing the differences between neuropsychology in Freudians day and in his own. The key difference to Levenson is one of holistic networks of mind versus hierarchical topologies of systems emphasizing different layers of control. Here we see how his thinking has progressed. In The Fallacy of Understanding, he thinks about social structures as being hierarchical with one controlling an other and so on, such that the individual was enmeshed some place in between. Now he thinks of control moving laterally and spatially in addition to vertically. This is of course possible due to the multi-faceted nature of signs, which have an over abundance of potential meanings. In this manner, novel meanings are continuously constructed by the individual. The openness of meaning making becomes an asset to therapy, as no longer does the therapist have to focus on an interpretation (a traditionally vertical process) but can instead explore the lateral and spatial aspects of meaning making. This shifts therapy from one of “cure” to one of “enrichment of networks”. Therapy now can focus on the novel and creative aspects of human meaning making as opposed to the destructive and conflictual.
When brought into the realm of mental life the construction of psychological problems can be thought of in a more open manner. Levenson draws our attention to the ambiguity about meaning and experience, (especially in the therapeutic relationship can itself) which is central to human beings. Indeed, it is precisely this ambiguity that semiotics both minimizes and maximizes. Towards this end, semiotics mediation involves or implies an ongoing relationship between the individual and their environment that is continuously being mediated by cultural tools, such as language. In addition to Levenson’s suggestion that psychological problems can result from not only not knowing how to use these tools, it is also possible that individuals are not able to appropriately navigate and/or regulate one’s cultural experiences. In this manner, semiotics can be used to trap individuals in meanings, by providing too much information to be navigated or even too little. Similarly, the individual becomes capable of constructing their own semiotic traps that can limit their meaning making (perhaps causing depression) or over extend it (leading to anxiety). Alternatively, psychological problems can be thought of as failures to interact with other individual’s patterns – or to be able to regulate self-other relationships. The idea of semiotic regulation (see for instance, Rosenbaum, 2008 attempts to articulate thoughts about how this fails in the case of depression) seems to fit nicely into Levenson’s network of mind.
While trying to put together a conclusion for this foray into Levenson’s thinking, I consistently got side tracked by thinking about why his ideas of psychological process have not been developed. While his key contribution of mutual enactment is almost universally accepted, it is generally located within psychological theories that have become increasingly reductionist. As far as I can see, despite his best effort at putting forth a unique structural and semiotic view of mind his ideas were transformed in such a way that still preserved the whole he was breaking away from. Perhaps what is necessary is to first unravel why certain dominant thoughts about thinking characterize the relationship between psychoanalysis and the individual and then think about providing alternative theories.
