Anyway, it's simply a fact that analytic philosophy in general (and ordinary language philosophy as well) are comparatively less invested in cultural and social levels of meaning. (Austin is more 'linguistic' and less 'historical' in focus than is, say, Foucault.) Open any continental-leaning publication and it will be more interested in ideology, history, the social milieu surrounding a given text, the production of authority in a given field, how a discourse 'creates' objects (such as 'the homosexual'), and most importantly the 'truth effects' (rather than 'validity') of a given statement. This whole methodology, which would be needed to unpack the APA policy, has no real counterpart in analytic philosophy. Even analytic philosophers I think would agree with this statement.

I do find it amusing though that after decades of lambasting continental folks for being so social and cultural (which were such dirty words), now they're mad that they're not being considered social enough!

Maybe I shouldn't have said “complete disregard” — I was being a little dramatic. But still, I do think that the language of the counterpetition is symptomatic of a certain analytic inattention to, or under-prioritization of, discourse, ideology, institutions. The language of the counterpetition is, you have to admit, distinctly analytic (whereas the language of the petition, also written by analytic philsophers, is not).

Then maybe the next step is to post seriously, non polemically, about what the real differences are. Maybe we can collaborate. Perhaps I went too far to make them seem as you say neatly reconciled. Point taken. Your diagnosis below, however, needs some serious re-working, because it misrepresents a great deal (not just outlying cases) of analytic philosophy, particularly when we think of ordinary language philosophy:

“their complete disregard for any kind of social or cultural-oriented dimension of language — so much so that even the clear-cut cases, like this one, can be borne away as so much semantics. And then, pulling up the rear, come their famous analogies, through which any politicized, contentious issue can be swiftly rendered, in the blink of an eye, harmless and oh so ordinary.”

But the next paragraph I think goes too far:

“It would, in fact, be hard to come up with a better example of how the analytic philosophical tradition has been compromised in the deepest way conceivable by their complete disregard for any kind of social or cultural-oriented dimension of language”

“Complete disregard”? What about ordinary language philosophy, arguably the most important movement in analytic philosophy in the last century? One could say that the work of Wittgenstein and his followers (I'm thinking of Cavell especially), is all about the social and cultural-oriented dimension of language.

I think the whole analytic vs. continental polemic is largely a dead end. Such polemics are usually a sign that both sides have stopped thinking. Some of the best philosophers work in both and show that the opposition is artificial (I'm thinking of Cavell and Rorty especially), and as I see it the best philosophers in the analytic tradition (at least in ethics, which I know more than the other philosophical problem spaces), are deeply invested in politics, contentious issues, and freely engage a whole host of traditionally non-analytic texts: literature, art, and yes, continental philosophy (I'm thinking of the work of Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum; Williams seems to have thought of himself at the end of his career as being directly in Nietzsche's lineage, and constantly engages literature; Nussbaum has written several books about contentious political issues that she does not reduce to mere “language” issues, whatever that would mean).

I think you're characterization might be right about some professional analytic philosophers but not all, and certainly not the best. And so what does it add up to? That any professional or academic field has a share of stupid, bigoted, morally dubious people should not surprise anyone. Thats not really a revelation, is it? We remember there are many stupid, bigoted, morally dubious people in the continental tradition (we can toss the Paul de Man grenade around sometime if we wish).

Attack the signers of the petition by all means. But I would hazard you against making such a wide, polemical attack against the philosophical school itself, in the general sense. Plenty of very smart people are bad people; we shouldn't let them off the hook in any way (especially here, when they misappropriate their philosophical vocabulary).

It would also be interesting to pair continental and analytic philosophers who are interested in similar issues, because I've found that one's understanding of a problem is increased by reading both simultaneously. I've done this by reading Williams on shame and Sartre on shame, and it was enriching. My simply plea is: why choose between analytic and continental? Why not have both? (Granted, not all philosophers on either side want both, but like I said I think thats small minded). Do it all baby; there's gold and dirt in every philosophical tradition you pick, let's be honest.