The Anti-Homosexual Counterpetition to the American Philosophical Association

By joneilortiz on March 2, 2009

A brilliant case of analytic sophistry can be observed unfolding in the counterpetition to the petition to reform the American Philosophical Association’s current failure to exclude, or at least reprimand, academic institutions that explicitly their staff from engaging in “homosexual acts”. Basically, as the counterpetition puts it, accurately it would seem,

The American Philosophical Association currently allows institutions that prohibit homosexual acts among their faculty, staff, and students to advertise in ‘Jobs for Philosophers.’ A petition recently submitted to the APA alleges that this practice is inconsistent with the APA’s anti-discrimination policy and calls for the APA either to “(1) enforce its policy and prohibit institutions that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation from advertising in ‘Jobs for Philosophers’ or [to] (2) clearly mark institutions with these policies as institutions that violate our anti-discrimination policy.”

The counterpetition, however, next makes use of some fancy footwork intended to make a forbiddance of homosexual acts not entail a forbiddance of homosexual orientation.

We reject the suggestion that there is an inconsistency between the practice in question and the APA’s anti-discrimination policy. Institutions can require their faculty to agree to abide by ethical standards that forbid homosexual acts while not ipso facto discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. The conceptual distinction between a certain kind of act and a disposition to perform that kind of act is one that no philosopher would fail to acknowledge in other ethical contexts. We fail to see why it should be ignored in this one.

The language employed here is remarkable. By deferring to some bogus, misappropriated philosophical distinction between ‘acts’ and ‘dispositions’, which they don’t feel requires any kind of elaboration, the authors actually manage to keep a straight face when they claim that a censure on homosexual acts is not at all a censure, singling-out, or case of discrimination against homosexuality.

It would, in fact, be hard to come up with a better example of how the analytic philosophical tradition has been compromised in the deepest way conceivable by their complete disregard for any kind of social or cultural-oriented dimension of language — so much so that even the clear-cut cases, like this one, can be borne away as so much semantics. And then, pulling up the rear, come their famous analogies, through which any politicized, contentious issue can be swiftly rendered, in the blink of an eye, harmless and oh so ordinary.

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  • the counterpetition is not friendly to those people.

  • I guess I was a little taken aback by the generality of your condemnation, the way it casts its net over the whole "analytic philosophical tradition." About the people who actually signed this petition, I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I think your diagnosis stands. But how representative are they, you think? After all, the text you're citing as a paradigmatic case of "analytic sophistry" is a counter-petition to an absolutely sane and responsible petition. The first petition, which urges the APA to stop its discriminatory practices, claims to have +750 in its first 60 hours. How many philosophers have signed or are going to sign the counter-petition? I doubt many, though here again maybe I'm being too optimistic.

    Maybe the next step is to post seriously, non polemically, about what the real differences between analytic and continental philosophy might be. Maybe we can collaborate. Perhaps I went too far to make them seem as you say neatly reconciled. Point taken. Your diagnosis below, however, needs some serious re-working, because it misrepresents a great deal (not just outlying cases) of analytic philosophy, particularly when we think of ordinary language philosophy:

    "their complete disregard for any kind of social or cultural-oriented dimension of language — so much so that even the clear-cut cases, like this one, can be borne away as so much semantics. And then, pulling up the rear, come their famous analogies, through which any politicized, contentious issue can be swiftly rendered, in the blink of an eye, harmless and oh so ordinary."

  • I'm aware of the ordinary language philosophers' claim to a sufficient analysis of 'the social' -- hence the joke in the last line ("And then [...] oh so ordinary") -- but I just don't consider this vein of philosophy all that social or cultural in purview. It's still very philosophical and linguistic at heart, without touching on much history, sociology, etc.

    Anyway, it's simply a fact that analytic philosophy in general (and ordinary language philosophy as well) are comparatively less invested in cultural and social levels of meaning. (Austin is more 'linguistic' and less 'historical' in focus than is, say, Foucault.) Open any continental-leaning publication and it will be more interested in ideology, history, the social milieu surrounding a given text, the production of authority in a given field, how a discourse 'creates' objects (such as 'the homosexual'), and most importantly the 'truth effects' (rather than 'validity') of a given statement. This whole methodology, which would be needed to unpack the APA policy, has no real counterpart in analytic philosophy. Even analytic philosophers I think would agree with this statement.

    I do find it amusing though that after decades of lambasting continental folks for being so social and cultural (which were such dirty words), now they're mad that they're not being considered social enough!

    Maybe I shouldn't have said "complete disregard" -- I was being a little dramatic. But still, I do think that the language of the counterpetition is symptomatic of a certain analytic inattention to, or under-prioritization of, discourse, ideology, institutions. The language of the counterpetition is, you have to admit, distinctly analytic (whereas the language of the petition, also written by analytic philsophers, is not).

  • Slow down there doggy. First, let me second you: the distinction between acts and dispositions in this context is odious, since whatever we think of such distinctions (and Foucault famously was troubled by the same issue, History of Sexuality Vol 1) we all know that in this case, today, such distinctions will make it easier for people to discriminate against homosexuals. There is no defense of that, whatever your philosophical position on the subject might be. You're absolutely right when you call that language "misappropriated" in this context and the signers of this petition should be taken severely to task.

    But the next paragraph I think goes too far:

    "It would, in fact, be hard to come up with a better example of how the analytic philosophical tradition has been compromised in the deepest way conceivable by their complete disregard for any kind of social or cultural-oriented dimension of language"

    "Complete disregard"? What about ordinary language philosophy, arguably the most important movement in analytic philosophy in the last century? One could say that the work of Wittgenstein and his followers (I'm thinking of Cavell especially), is all about the social and cultural-oriented dimension of language.

    I think the whole analytic vs. continental polemic is largely a dead end. Such polemics are usually a sign that both sides have stopped thinking. Some of the best philosophers work in both and show that the opposition is artificial (I'm thinking of Cavell and Rorty especially), and as I see it the best philosophers in the analytic tradition (at least in ethics, which I know more than the other philosophical problem spaces), are deeply invested in politics, contentious issues, and freely engage a whole host of traditionally non-analytic texts: literature, art, and yes, continental philosophy (I'm thinking of the work of Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum; Williams seems to have thought of himself at the end of his career as being directly in Nietzsche's lineage, and constantly engages literature; Nussbaum has written several books about contentious political issues that she does not reduce to mere "language" issues, whatever that would mean).

    I think your characterization might be right about some professional analytic philosophers but not all, and certainly not the best. And so what does it add up to? That any professional or academic field has a share of stupid, bigoted, morally dubious people should not surprise anyone. Thats not really a revelation, is it? We remember there are many stupid, bigoted, morally dubious people in the continental tradition (we can toss the Paul de Man grenade around sometime if we wish). In short, plenty of very smart people are bad people; we shouldn't let them off the hook in any way (especially here, when they misappropriate their philosophical vocabulary). But I would hazard you against making such a wide, polemical attack against the philosophical school itself.

    In the spirit of inclusion, it would also be interesting to pair continental and analytic philosophers who are interested in similar issues, because I've found that one's understanding of a problem is increased by reading both simultaneously. I've done this by reading Williams on shame and Sartre on shame, and it was enriching. My simple plea is: why choose between analytic and continental? Why not have both? (Granted, not all philosophers on either side want both, but like I said I think that's small minded). There's good and bad in every philosophical tradition you pick, let's be honest. But to hunker down in one, whatever it is, seems wrong-headed. Lots of people do it for professional, disciplinary motives rather than purely intellectual reasons. The academy is a petty, hyper-competitive, oftentimes small-minded place. Again, there should be no revelation here.

    In its most ambitious and indeed oldest conception of itself, philosophy is the search for truth. In real terms, now, the philosopher can help clarify and challenge our thinking about a whole range of issues (ethics, the mind, politics, etc etc). As I see it, that work of clarifying and challenging our thinking often takes two basic forms: the philosopher by the force of his argument tells you either that a) you are using a single big lumpy word or concept to cover a whole range of separate issues or b) the things that you so quickly and strongly separate are actually part of the same problem. In the first case (a), the philosopher will tend to make distinctions to show how one thing is really two; in the second case (b), the philosopher will tend to draw counter-intuitive parallels to show how two things are really one. I believe so-called analytic philosophy favors the (a) side, and so-called continental the (b) side, but they're after the same thing. They are best seen not so much as warring schools or embittered enemies; rather they embody different approaches or, better yet, different orientations. Irony intended.

  • Sure, one's work can span analytic and continental traditions, and the polemic may be a dead end for conversation, but that doesn't mean the two can be neatly reconciled, which your language suggests. (I take strong issue with your closing paragraph that sums up the two traditions' place in the world as a sort of perfectly inversive but complementary puzzle where everything fits together in the end. If that's true, then why all the passionate, career-killing controversy?) There is plenty of analytic philosophy I like and agree with, and we could both list off exceptions to the rule, but it would be absurd to then say that the opposition is merely illusory or a matter of perspective. The analytic-continental divide may be fraying in parts but it's still very real.

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